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REGULATING SAFETY-CAN THE NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD AND THE
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION IMPROVE
THE SAFETY OF EMS FLIGHTS?
J. CADE HAMNER*
A RECENT RASH of accidents involving Emergency Medical
Service (EMS) flights is raising eyebrows.1 EMS flights,
most commonly Helicopter Emergency Medical Service
(HEMS) flights, provide an important service in transporting pa-
tients to emergency care facilities, 2 and are often used in a vari-
ety of instances where other methods of EMS transportation are
impractical, if not impossible. Fueled by rapid growth in the
first four years of this century, today there are approximately
840 EMS helicopters in operation nationwide.' During this pe-
riod of rapid growth, the number of accidents almost doubled
from the total in the mid-1990s.4 Though EMS flights are inher-
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industry focusing primarily on electronic equities and derivatives trading. The
author would like to thank his wife and their son for their love, patience, and
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I See National Transportation Safety Board, Most Wanted Transportation
Safety Improvements: Aviation, Improve the Safety of Emergency Medical Service
Flights (2008), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/mostwanted/aviationim-
provesafety-emsjflights.html. Between December 2007 and October 2008, nine
EMS helicopter accidents occurred in which thirty-five people were killed. Id.
2 National Transportation Safety Board, Special Investigation Report on Emer-
gency Medical Services Operations, at vii (2006), available at http://www.ntsb.
gov/publictn/2006/SIR0601.pdf [hereinafter NTSB Special Investigation
Report].
3 Federal Aviation Administration, Fact Sheet, Helicopter Emergency Medical
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ently dangerous, 5 the recent wave of crashes begs a few ques-
tions. Who regulates the safety standards of EMS flights? How,
and under what circumstances, are EMS flights dispatched? Are
EMS flights necessary in all instances in which they are used?
What laws or administrative procedures determine when an
EMS flight may or may not be used? Who has the authority to
determine whether such flights are necessary? Are EMS flights
used in situations where EMS ground transportation is a more
viable option? This comment will review a brief history of EMS
flights, recent accident statistics involving these flights, the cur-
rent federal administrative procedures EMS aviation companies
must follow, and changes to safety standards being proposed by
the various federal agencies tasked with regulating such flights.
Ultimately, this comment will show that most of the enforce-
ment authority surrounding the safety and regulatory oversight
of EMS flights lies with the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA).6 The FAA can and should place requirements on HEMS
operators that will improve safety, reduce the number of acci-
dents, and improve the operating efficiency of these flights.
EMS flight operators provide a valuable, often life-saving service.
Implementing the recommendations outlined in the National
Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) Most Wanted List, re-
leased in October 2008 and discussed herein, is the surest way to
make an immediate impact on the safety of these EMS flights.7
I. OVERVIEW OF EMS FLIGHTS
A. OPERATING REQUIREMENTS
EMS flights primarily operate under one of two parts of Title
14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 91 or Part 135.8 Part
91 encompasses general rules for operating an aircraft within
the United States or within three nautical miles of the coast.9
When EMS flights are conducted without patients on board, the
flight operator is permitted to operate under Part 91, which is
primarily for "private" operations. 10 These so-called positioning
flights are better described as the outbound leg of an EMS
5 NTSB Special Investigation Report, supra note 2, at vii.
6 Department of Transportation Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-449, 96 Stat. 2416
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.); see also infra Part II.B.
7 See NTSB, Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements, supra note 1;
see also infra Part II.A.2.
8 NTSB Special Investigation Report, supra note 2, at 1.
9 14 C.F.R. § 91.1 (2009).
10 NTSB Special Investigation Report, supra note 2, at 1.
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flight: when an EMS flight is in route to pick up a patient."
Alternatively, commuter and on-demand operations, basically
commercial "for-hire" flights, are required to follow the more
stringent rules of Part 135.12 When passengers other than crew
members, namely patients, are on board an EMS flight it falls
under Part 135.'1 Many of the recent accidents that have taken
place occurred while the flights were being operated under Part
91, and though no patients were aboard these flights, medical
crew members were.' 4
One distinct difference in the requirements within Part 91
and Part 135 deals with weather and visibility minimums.' 5
Under the basic visual flight rules (VFR) of Part 91, helicopters
must simply remain "clear of clouds" when operating at an alti-
tude of less than 1200 feet. 6 Part 135 VFR is more stringent,
requiring one-half mile visibility during the day and one mile
visibility at night when flying a helicopter at altitudes below 1200
feet.'7 These minimums can be even more stringent for certain
EMS helicopter operations.' 8 Under Part 135, flights are also
not permitted to operate under VFR unless the pilot "has visual
surface reference or, at night, visual surface light reference, suf-
ficient to safely control the helicopter."' 9
Parts 91 and 135 also differ significantly regarding the re-
quirements of crew rest. Part 135 requires that the crew "obtain
adequate rest before conducting an EMS flight with a patient on
board. '20 Specifically, crew members are required to have be-
tween nine and eleven hours of rest in any twenty-four hour pe-
riod.2 1 Further, under Part 135 maximum duty time is set at
fourteen hours. 22 In stark contrast, Part 91 has no duty time
maximums.2 3 Moreover, a pilot can work the maximum duty
hours under Part 135 and then proceed to fly the helicopter
11 Id.
12 14 C.F.R. § 135.1(a)(1) (2009).
13 NTSB Special Investigation Report, supra note 2, at 1.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 14 C.F.R. § 91.155(a) (2009); see also NTSB Special Investigation Report,
supra note 2, at 1.
17 14 C.F.R. § 135.205(b) (2009).
18 NTSB Special Investigation Report, supra note 2, at 1.
19 14 C.F.R. § 135.207 (2009).
20 NTSB Special Investigation Report, supra note 2, at 1-2.
21 See 14 C.F.R. § 135.265(b) (2009).
22 14 C.F.R. § 135.267(c) (2009); see also NTSB Special Investigation Report,
supra note 2, at 2.
23 NTSB Special Investigation Report, supra note 2, at 2.
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back to its departure base with no patient on board under Part
91, thereby escaping Part 135 duty requirements.24
B. ARE EMS FLIGHTS USED UNNECESSARILY?
EMS flights no doubt serve a valuable purpose in transporting
trauma patients, the critically ill or sick, and those in rural areas
in need of immediate or expedited care. But are EMS flights
ever used when other, more viable forms of transportation
would be a safer alternative, not to mention more practical?
Some reports seem to suggest that the answer to this question is
yes. 25
Some emergency physicians feel that EMS flights put many
patients at risk unnecessarily. 26
'The majority of these patients could have gone by ground just as
well at 10 percent the cost and more safely .... [S] tudies have
shown that patients do just as well when transported by ground
ambulance[,]' said Dr. Bryan Bledsoe, a clinical professor of
emergency medicine at the University of Nevada School of
Medicine who has been studying the use of medical helicopters
for six years.27
Dr. Bledsoe argues that while EMS flights are important, their
overuse has become unsafe.28 In his opinion, for-profit EMS
flight companies are interested in making money, and hospitals
use the helicopters as marketing tools. 29 A formalized decision-
making process and dispatch procedure would solve some of the
perceived misuse of EMS flights and likely lead to a better evalu-
ation process for deciding on how to transport a patient."
When transporting a patient between hospitals, the referring
physician typically decides on the method of transportation,
though there are few professional standards on deploying EMS
helicopters for non-trauma transfers. 1 Dr. Bledsoe added that
"[t]here is no evidence on the use of helicopters for interhos-
pital transportation," though most EMS flights involve these
24 Id.
25 See TradingMarkets.com, Flights Rise; So Does Debate: Some Say Most
Chopper Transports Not Necessary, http://www.tradingmarkets.com/.site/





30 See infra Parts IV.B.-C.
31 See TradingMarkets.com, supra note 25.
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types of transports.3 2 He argues that an "objective evidence-
based" study is needed to assure that future flights are only used
for patients who will benefit from this type of transportation. 3
Dr. Ira Blumen, medical director of the University of Chicago
Aeromedical Network, believes the "[s]peed and better care are
the major advantages over ground transport. '34 Though the
overuse of EMS helicopter flights is not surprising, Dr. Blumen
adds that "'it's difficult at times to try to second-guess the doctor
at the bedside when he or she feels a patient needs to be trans-
ported by helicopter.' 3
5
Following the crash of a Maryland EMS helicopter in Septem-
ber 2008, questions were raised about the necessity of such
flights. 36
The question of when helicopters are appropriate has gained in-
creasing attention in the medical community, as the number of
fatal medevac crashes surged. A review by The Baltimore Sun of
crash records and other documents related to the 26 most recent
fatal accidents in the United States found that at least eight in-
volved patients who waited longer for a helicopter than a ground
ambulance might have needed to drive them to a hospital. At
least six involved patients discharged soon after a helicopter
dropped them off at a hospital, or who survived a lengthy ambu-
lance ride after the helicopter sent to get them went down.3 7
The Maryland crash involved patients who were initially classi-
fied as being in a less serious and non-life threatening condi-
tion.3 Paramedics later determined the patients might have
more serious injuries after surveying damage to the car they
were traveling in.3 9 This situation underscores the need for a
more formalized analysis and pre-flight planning procedure de-
signed to prevent misuse of EMS flights along with accidents.4 °
Further, tapes of a conversation between the EMS helicopter pi-





36 See Robert Little, Medevac Pilot Was Told Crew Didn't "Want To Drive, BALTI-






40 See infra Parts IV.B-C.
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garding EMS providers on the ground in Charles County and
how they typically do not want "to drive to the hospital."' In
this case the drive would have been about thirty-two miles. 42
The Charles County director of fire and rescue services rebut-
ted the idea that ambulance crews in the county are reluctant to
drive such a distance and pointed out that protocol gives discre-
tion on what type of transportation to use to providers at the
scene.4 3 Though officials say they were "disturbed" by the con-
versation between the pilot and dispatcher, they pointed out
that statistically Charles County did not appear to excessively call
for helicopter transport.44
II. REGULATORY OVERSIGHT
A. NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
1. NTSB-Administrative Background
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB, Safety
Board, or Board) is an independent agency within the federal
government 45 that investigates all civil aviation accidents in the
United States.46 Additionally, to prevent future accidents, the
NTSB issues safety recommendations.4 7 The five members of
the bi-partisan Board are appointed by the President, confirmed
by the Senate, and serve a five-year term.' At least three mem-
bers of the Board must be appointed on factors of technical and
professional qualifications, which focus on various aspects of
transportation safety and accident reconstruction.4 9 The NTSB
may submit a recommendation regarding transportation safety
to the Secretary of Transportation, which requires a written re-
sponse within ninety days, and must indicate whether the Secre-
tary intends to carry out the recommendation.50 The Secretary
of Transportation must then submit a report to both Congress




45 49 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (2000 & Supp. V).
46 See id. § 1132(a)(1); see also About the NTSB, History and Mission, http://
www.ntsb.gov/abt-ntsb/history.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2009).
47 About the NTSB, History and Mission, supra note 46.
48 49 U.S.C. § 1111(b)-(c).
49 Id.
50 Id. § 1135(a).
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and the Safety Board containing the status of each recommen-
dation that is on the Board's annual "Most Wanted List. 51
2. NTSB's Most Wanted List
In 1990, the NTSB began highlighting some of its most de-
sired safety improvements in a Most Wanted List.52 The NTSB,
however, has no regulatory responsibility and does not initiate
enforcement actions. 5 Enforcement responsibilities, with re-
spect to civil aviation matters, lie with the FAA.54
The NTSB released its 2008 Most Wanted List in October. 55
The list is intended to raise awareness and support for safety
issues within the transportation field.56 EMS flights made the
list for the first time in 2008. 5' The NTSB listed four goals as its
objective for improving EMS flight safety.58 First, the Safety
Board recommended that EMS flights be conducted in accor-
dance with the stricter guidelines of Part 135 whenever medical
personnel are on board.59 The Safety Board next recom-
mended the development and implementation of flight risk
evaluation programs for EMS operators. 60 The third recommen-
dation the Safety Board made was to require "formalized dis-
patch and flight-following procedures" that include real-time
weather updates.61 Finally, the Safety Board suggested that ter-
rain awareness and warning systems (TAWS) be installed on
EMS aircraft.62
This Most Wanted List of recommended improvements fol-
lows a January 2006 report on EMS operations that included the
same recommendations. 63 The Safety Board points out that
nine EMS helicopter accidents, in which thirty-five people were
51 Id. § 1135(d).
52 About the NTSB, History and Mission, supra note 46.
53 Id.
54 49 U.S.C. § 44701 (a)(1)-(5).
55 NTSB, Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements, supra note 1.
56 Jessica Zigmond, NTSB Adds EMS Flights to 'Most Wanted' Safety List, MODERN
HEALTHCARE.COM, Nov. 3, 2008, http://www.modernhealthcare.com/apps/pbcs.
dll/article?AID=/20081103/REG/810319952.
57 Mary Grady, NTSB Wants Safer Medical Flights, AVWeb, Oct. 29, 2008, http://
w-.avweb.com/avwebflash/news/NTSBWantsSaferMedicalFlights-199085-1.
html.





63 See NTSB Special Investigation Report, supra note 2, at vii.
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killed, occurred between its release of the January 2006 report
and the publication of the Most Wanted List in October of
2008.64 The Safety Board expressed its concern that unless a
"concerted effort" is made, accidents are likely to continue to
occur.65 In summarizing actions taken by the FAA, the NTSB
strongly criticized the FAA's efforts, stating:
Despite the FAA's efforts to improve EMS operations safety, the
FAA has not imposed any requirements on aircraft EMS opera-
tors regarding flights conducted without patients on board, risk
management, flight dispatch, or the use of such technology as
TAWS or H-TAWS. The FAA's published notices simply consti-
tute information that principle operations inspectors may pro-
vide to their operators and encourage the operators to
incorporate .... [T]he Board is concerned that until the FAA
institutes our recommended requirements, some EMS operators
will continue to operate in an unsafe manner, which could lead
to further accidents. 66
In response to the publication of the NTSB's Most Wanted
list, the FAA said it agreed with the recommendations.6 7 A
spokesman for the FAA noted that due to the nature of the fed-
eral rulemaking process, rulemaking is seldom the fastest way to
adopt change.68 According to the spokesman, the FAA has
worked with EMS flight operators in recent years to adopt safer
policies, decision-making protocols, and technologies that focus
on safety. 69
B. FEDERAL AvIATION ADMINISTRATION
1. FAA-Administrative Background
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA or Agency) is an
administration within the Department of Transportation.7 ° The
FAA is granted various powers and duties under Title 49 of the
federal code.7 The head of the FAA is referred to as the Ad-
ministrator and is appointed by the President and confirmed by
64 NTSB, Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements, supra note 1.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Zigmond, supra note 56.
s Id.
69 Id.
70 49 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2000 & Supp. V).
71 Department of Transportation Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-449, 96 Stat. 2416
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
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the Senate.72 The Administrator, as a general requirement,
must carry out the promotion of safety with regards to civil aero-
nautics. 7 This is achieved in part by prescribing minimum stan-
dards for the design and application of aircraft, the inspection
and servicing of aircraft, the maximum hours aircraft may fly
between inspections and servicing, the qualifications required of
personnel who operate aircraft, and so on. 74 Further, the Ad-
ministrator is specifically tasked with the reduction and elimination
of accidents. 75 As the federal regulatory body of EMS flight op-
erators, the FAA's role in reducing HEMS accidents is not only
crucial, it is required by federal law.76
2. FAA Action
The FAA has taken a number of steps in recent years to im-
prove the safety of EMS flights, particularly HEMS operations.77
In 2004, the FAA was able to initiate a partnership between gov-
ernment regulators and industry participants that effectively re-
duced the number of HEMS accidents for the two years
following.7 In the past year, however, the number of fatal acci-
dents is up sharply.79 The FAA is following the recommenda-
tions of the NTSB by persuing new rules and, at the same time,
taking significant action that does not require new rulemak-
ing.80 The Agency aims to make significant safety gains in the
near term with these non-rulemaking actions.8 " The FAA's im-
mediate focus includes: encouraging risk-management training;
better training for night operations and operations in deterio-
rating weather conditions; the promotion of technologies such
as night vision goggles (NVGs) and terrain awareness and warn-
ing systems (TAWS); and providing "airline-type" FAA oversight
for operators.8 2
Beyond inspection and surveillance, the FAA takes initiative
through a risk-based system that focuses on factors contributing
72 49 U.S.C. § 106(b).
73 See id. § 44701.
74 See id.
75 Id. § 44701 (c).
76 See id.
77 See FAA, Fact Sheet, supra note 3.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. See also NTSB, Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements, supra
note 1.
81 FAA, Fact Sheet, supra note 3.
82 Id.
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to HEMS accidents. 83 A fact sheet released on January 15,
2009,84 highlighted some of the actions the FAA has taken in the
past with regards to improving HEMS flights.8 ' In 2004, as men-
tioned above, the FAA established a government and industry
task force.86 In January of the following year, the FAA met with
industry groups in order to open a dialogue dealing with EMS
flight safety.87 Several weeks later the Administration published
a notice that provided guidance to operators on various issues
from pilot and mechanic decision-making to crew manage-
ment.8 In September 2005, guidance on Air Medical Resource
Management (AMRM) training was issued, and focused on the
broad array of members that make up an air medical team.89
The next week, "revised standards for inspection and surveil-
lance of HEMS operators" were issued." In early 2006, revised
guidance was issued to inspectors, amending the VFR weather
requirements.9 1 This was followed by a request in June of 2006
for the establishment of a committee to develop standards for
Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (H-
TAWS) .92 This committee could be instrumental in the imple-
mentation of H-TAWS for HEMS operations, as recommended
by the NTSB
The FAA also established a task group that focuses on large
HEMS operators that service a broad group of medical pro-
grams throughout the country.94 And in 2008, the Administra-
tion issued a "best practices" advisory for HEMS operators in
May, followed by a meeting in July with the Association of Air
Medical Service (AAMS), regarding the use of NVGs among
other topics.95
The FAA issued a notice of mandatory changes in HEMS
flights in November of 2008.96 The notice contained a revision
83 Id.









93 See NTSB, Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements, supra note 1;
see also infra Part IV.D. (discussion on Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems).
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of Operations Specifications.9 7 Specifically, "if a flight, or se-
quence of flights, includes a part 135 segment then all visual
flight rules (VFR) segments of the flight must be conducted
within the weather minimums and minimum safe cruise altitude
determined in pre-flight planning."'98 Further, the notice con-
tained revised weather minimums by which pilots must deter-
mine the required minimum ceiling and visibility to conduct a
HEMS flight.9 9 In providing more access to weather reporting,
the FAA is requiring flight crews to determine minimum safe
altitudes prior to initiating a flight.'0 0
The FAA has also stated its support for the voluntary use of
TAWS by HEMS operators.'1 However, the Administration has
yet to require the use of such system in HEMS operations.
10 2
Though it has considered implementing this measure, the Ad-
ministration feels "that there are a number of issues unique to
VFR helicopter operations that must be resolved before the FAA
considers mandating the use of TAWS in this area."'0 3 Specifi-
cally, the Administration cited potential false warnings and nui-
sance warnings generated at low altitude operation which may
negatively impact pilots who are already attempting to safely op-
erate the aircraft.104 Regarding nuisance warnings, one study
suggests that
[t]he effectiveness of TAWS is dependent on the balance be-
tween saves and nuisance warnings. Excessive nuisance warnings
can degrade the pilot's confidence in the system to the point
where the pilot will deactivate or ignore the system. The objec-
tive for TAWS should be to give the maximum save percentage
while minimizing nuisance warnings during a typical aircraft
mission. 1°5
97 See Helicopter Emergency Medical Services Operations, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,564









105 Annette Barnhart & Kurt Engel, Rotary Wing Terrain Awareness Warning
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Following a report of the committee mentioned above, created
to develop standards for H-TAWS, the Administration issued an
order to "standardize the manufacture of H-TAWS.' 10 6
C. CONGRESS
Congress has the ability and the authority to impact the safety
measures used by the EMS flight industry. Both the NTSB and
the FAA are federal agencies created by statute.1 °7 Ultimately,
Congress can create new statutes requiring either agency to
adopt a particular policy. Due to the recent rash of accidents,
some members of Congress are taking an interest in the industry
of EMS flights. 10 8 In fact, recently introduced bills echo the rec-
ommendations of the NTSB's Most Wanted List. 09
Senate Bill 3229, the Air Medical Service Safety Improvement
Act of 2008, was introduced by Sen. Cantwell of Washington
State and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation." The bill calls for all EMS aircraft, both
helicopter and fixed-wing, to comply with Part 135 whenever
medical personnel are on board, with the exception of training
missions."' The bill also requires the implementation of a flight
risk evaluation program to begin no later than sixty days after
the bill is enacted.' 2 A standardized checklist of risk evaluation
factors would be part of the risk evaluation. 1 3 Further, the bill
would require changes to dispatch procedures, calling for "per-
formance based flight dispatch and flight-following proce-
dures." ' 4 The bill also calls for improved situational awareness
via the use of a "terrain awareness and warning system that
meets the requirements of the applicable Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration Technical Standard Order."' '15
106 FAA, Fact Sheet, supra note 3; Federal Aviation Administration, Technical
Standard Order C-194 (Dec. 17, 2008), available at http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory
_andGuidanceLibrary/rgtso.nsf/0/4e324b446be 11 b2d8625752300762a36/$
FILE/TSO-C 194.pdf.
107 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 106, 1111(a) (2000 & Supp. V).
108 See S. 3229, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008); H.R. 3939, 110th Cong. (1st. Sess.
2007).
109 See S. 3229; H.R. 3939.
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House Bill 3939 was introduced by Rep. Doolittle of Califor-
nia, now retired, and Rep. Salazar of Colorado.1 16 The bill calls
for all EMS flights to operate under Part 135 whenever medical
personnel are on board unless operating under instrument
flight rules.117 If operating under instrument flight rules, the
duty and rest-time rules of Part 135 would apply.'1 8 The bill also
requires the implementation of flight risk evaluation proce-
dures, which includes standardized risk evaluation factors.'19 Pi-
lots would be required to use the standardized evaluation
checklist when determining whether a mission should be ac-
cepted.121 Much like the Senate bill, House Bill 3939 would also
require "comprehensive consistent flight dispatch procedures"
that are performance based, along with a measurement of
compliance. 2
1
D. STATE AND LocAL AUTHORITY
State and local regulatory bodies are preempted by federal
authority in the field of aviation safety.' 22 In Abdullah v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc., the Third Circuit stated that "contrary to courts
that have found that federal law does not preempt state and ter-
ritorial air safety standards .... we find implied federal preemp-
tion of the entire field of aviation safety. ' 123 Obviously, this
would include HEMS operations. The Third Circuit clarified its
reasoning by explaining that "[o]ur finding on preemption is
based on our determination that the FAA and relevant federal
regulations establish complete and thorough safety standards
for interstate and international air transportation and that these
standards are not subject to supplementation by, or variations
among, jurisdictions.' 1 24 It is important to note, however, that
the court did conclude that "state and territorial damage reme-
dies still exist for violation of those standards.' '1 25





121 See id.; see also S. 3229, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008).
122 See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958),
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-49105(2000 & Supp. V)); Abdullah
v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 365 (3d. Cir. 1999).
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The Third Circuit's decision has been followed by the Second
Circuit in Drake v. Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings12 6 and by
the Ninth Circuit in Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines.127 The Second
Circuit reiterated in Drake that state law remedies are not pre-
empted by the federal government as are state law substantive
standards. 12 Elaborating on the notion of implied preemption
in Montalvo, the Ninth Circuit explained that "[i]mplied pre-
emption exists when federal law so thoroughly occupies a legis-
lative field 'as to make reasonable the inference that Congress
left no room for the States to supplement it."1 29 Further, field
preemption "occurs when Congress indicates in some manner
an intent to occupy a given field to the exclusion of state law.' 130
It was the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that Congress has "indi-
cated its intent to be the sole regulator of aviation safety."''
Thus, any state or local laws with respect to EMS flight safety are
federally preempted.
III. ADDITIONAL STAKEHOLDERS
A. RESPONSIBILITY LYING WITH CREW AND MANAGEMENT
Some experts argue that legislative or administrative man-
dates are unnecessary and fail to recognize that the primary
cause of accidents lies with the imprudent decision making of
flight crews.132 Ed MacDonald is lead pilot for an EMS flight
operator in Santa Fe, New Mexico, and holds committee and
advisory positions with various EMS flight organizations.1 3 Mac-
Donald contends that "[p]oor decision making and apparent
loss of situational awareness continue as root causes [of EMS
flight accidents] -almost nothing in proposed legislation will
have any effect on the most basic reasons we have accidents in
our community." ' 4 Further, EMS flights would likely be made
safer if solutions were geared toward "poor or pressured deci-
sion making" by pilots.135 Though he does argue that legislative
126 Drake v. Lab. Corp. of America Holdings, 458 F.3d 48, 64 (2d Cir. 2006).
127 Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 2007).
128 Drake, 458 F.3d at 64 (citing Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 375).
129 Montalvo, 508 F.3d at 470 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504, 516 (1992)).
130 Id. at 470 (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516).
131 Id.
132 See Ed MacDonald, Fixing What's Broken, 28 AIR MED. J. 12, 12 (2009).
133 See id. at 13 (see bio following article).
- Id. at 12.
135 Id.
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or administrative measures are unnecessary, MacDonald seems
to be supporting the types of flight-risk planning and formalized
dispatch procedures recommended by the NTSB. 136
MacDonald finds irony in the fact that none of the key deci-
sion makers in Congress, the NTSB, nor the FAA, have experi-
ence as an EMS pilot.13 7 He was hopeful that those decision
makers would listen to pilots at hearings scheduled for February
2009.138 "Far too many clinicians and business managers are try-
ing to make decisions that they are very simply not capable of
making.' ' 39
MacDonald believes organizational structures contribute to
the rash of recent accidents as well, as safety too often takes a
back seat to the business plans of EMS flight companies. 4 °
Managers often use flight volume as the measure of success
when comparing their own companies with the competition.14'
This, MacDonald suggests, sends a message that safety is not the
number one goal.14 2 And though MacDonald is not calling for
administrative action, this is where the FAA should step in and
require improvements in safety-as safety is one of the primary
reasons for the Agency's existence.'4 3
MacDonald raises questions concerning the leadership of
companies, such as, whether proper emphasis is placed on mak-
ing safety a top priority, or whether companies are thrusting
leaders into positions without giving them the tools they need to
succeed. 1" Many companies have a process for effectively se-
lecting their leadership and ensuring their success, and these
are the companies that others in the industry should model
their own companies after. 45 MacDonald notes that selecting
effective management and ensuring they have the tools neces-
sary to prioritize safety is not something that the NTSB will focus
its attention on.1"6 The FAA, however, is certainly required by
statute to do so. 1 7 In order for the industry to make real pro-
136 See NTSB, Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements, supra note 1.
137 MacDonald, supra note 132, at 12.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 See id. at 13.
141 Id.
142 Id.
'43 See 49 U.S.C. § 44701(c) (2000 & Supp. V).
44 MacDonald, supra note 132, at 12.
145 Id. at 13.
146 Id.
147 See 49 U.S.C. § 44701(c).
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gress in what MacDonald feels are "ailing safety cultures," bridg-
ing the existing "leadership gaps" should be the primary
focus. 148
MacDonald's advice for improving safety is practical and
sound. He calls for pilots, managers, and other players to draw
upon thirty years of collective experience as an industry. 149 He
encourages those involved to "follow the rules and lessons
learned.., to take a hard, honest look at deficiencies within our
own organizations."' 50
IV. DETAILING THE NTSB'S MOST WANTED
A. OPERATE ALL EMS FLIGHTS UNDER PART 135
The NTSB stated in its January 2006 special investigation re-
port that "EMS operations should [not] be permitted to con-
tinue to operate under the less strict requirements of Part 91
simply because a patient is not on board. ' 151 As discussed ear-
lier, Parts 91 and 135 differ in requirements of weather and visi-
bility minimums, as well as crew rest and maximum duty time
guidelines. 5 2 When pilots are allowed to operate an outbound
flight under Part 91 "in minimal weather conditions or near the
end of their duty time" they are likely to be significantly influ-
enced by a patient's critical condition to complete the mission,
even if not permissible under Part 135.153 The Safety Board ad-
ded that missions should not be attempted if "unable to operate
safely under Part 135 requirements.' 1 54
The Safety Board believes that positioning flights, whether en
route to pick up a patient or returning to base after dropping
off a patient, should not be separated from the actual patient-
transportation flights.1 55 Since the EMS mission is composed of
the positioning leg or legs, and the patient-transportation leg,
"the Safety Board conclude [d] that the safety of EMS operations
would be improved if the entire EMS flight plan operated under
Part 135 operations specifications." 56 Moreover, because all
EMS operators must follow Part 135 when transporting patients,
148 MacDonald, supra note 132, at 13.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 NTSB Special Investigation Report, supra note 2, at 2.
152 See supra Part I.A.
153 NTSB Special Investigation Report, supra note 2, at 2.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 3.
156 Id.
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little change would be necessary in the way those same operators
fly when patients are not on board. 157 The Safety Board believes
that it would be prudent for the FAA to mandate that all EMS
flights operate under Part 135 whenever medical personnel are
on board. 15
B. FLIGHT RISK EVALUATION
Though HEMS operations are inherently dangerous, evaluat-
ing the risks associated with each HEMS flight can improve the
likelihood of a safe and successful mission. 59 The special inves-
tigation report issued by the NTSB in January 2006 discussed a
2002 study by the Air Medical Physician Association (AMPA).16 °
The AMPA's study highlighted operational risks such as "unpre-
pared landing sites, complacency, and situational stress[,]" in
addition to the risks associated with weather and nighttime
flight identified by the Safety Board? 6' Flight risk evaluation
programs systematically evaluate and manage these risks. "[A] n
effective flight risk evaluation program acknowledges and iden-
tifies threats, evaluates and prioritizes the risks, considers the
probability that a risk will materialize, and mitigates loss.162
One difficult aspect of flight risk evaluation is the fact that the
person or persons conducting the evaluation must separate the
initial urgency that comes with the call requesting emergency
services from the evaluation of flight risks.1
63
The 2006 NTSB report used the details of a 2003 accident in
Salt Lake City to demonstrate how a flight risk evaluation pro-
gram could have helped to avoid an accident in which the pilot
and flight paramedic were killed. 6 4 Prior to the accident flight
operated by Intermountain Health Care (IHC), another HEMS
operator aborted the same mission due to bad weather condi-
tions. 1 65 Upon returning to base, the pilot who aborted the mis-
sion contacted the IHC pilot who was then attempting the
mission and learned that he was going to try to "get over" the
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 See id. at 4.
160 See id.
161 Id.
162 See id. (citing AMPA study).
163 See id.
164 See id.
165 Id. app. A at 17-18.
2009] 613
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
fog that caused the initial pilot to abort.166 The IHC pilot also
informed a dispatcher that the weather had taken a turn for the
worse.'6 7 As weather conditions worsened, the IHC pilot also
attempted to abort the mission. 168 Unfortunately, the pilot was
unable to safely land the aircraft.169 The NTSB determined that
"the pilot's delayed remedial action and continued flight into
known adverse weather conditions ... resulted in his failure to
maintain clearance with the ground.""17  "[P]revailing fog and
the pressure to complete the mission" were cited as contributing
factors to the accident. 171
The NTSB noted that a flight risk evaluation program did not
exist at IHC at the time of the Salt Lake City accident. 72 Had
one been in place, "the pilot would likely have been required to
complete a standardized flight risk evaluation matrix before the
flight, including assessing weather minimums and the route of
flight.' 7 ' Given the poor nighttime weather conditions, the
mission would have been evaluated as a mission of higher risk.174
And a "systematic evaluation" of the risks associated with the
mission may have resulted in a decision not to initiate the
flight. 75
Though the NTSB recognizes the FAA's attempts to encourage
flight risk evaluation programs, the Safety Board feels these pro-
grams should be required of EMS operators.1 76 Put simply, "the
FAA should require all EMS operators to develop and imple-
ment flight risk evaluation programs.' v7 7 Certainly, the inclu-
sion of flight risk evaluation programs in the Safety Board's
Most Wanted List reiterates its desire to see these programs
implemented. 178
166 Id,





172 See id. at 4.
173 Id. at 4.
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176 Id. at 5-6.
177 Id. at 6.
178 See NTSB, Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements, supra note 1.
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C. FLIGHT DISPATCH
Improving the dispatch procedures of EMS flights is a vital
part of improving the overall safety of EMS flights. 179 The NTSB
has specifically recommended formalized dispatch procedures
for a number of years and stated so quite clearly, both in the
October 2008 Most Wanted List and earlier in a January 2006
special report. ° Currently, pilots are often notified by 911 op-
erators or hospital staff of an emergency that requires an air-
borne EMS operation.8 1 However, neither 911 dispatchers nor
hospital staff typically have the expertise needed to advise the
flight crew on weather conditions, or flight and landing proce-
dures.18 2 Because traditional EMS dispatchers typically have a
medical background, the tasks of gathering information regard-
ing flight routes, landing operations, and weather conditions
are often left to the pilot or crew. l8" Recently, as highlighted by
both the NTSB and the FAA, awareness has risen that dispatch-
ers need some type of aviation training as well. l8 4
The Safety Board's 2006 special report claims that eleven of
fifty-five accidents for the period that the report covers may have
had a different outcome had formalized dispatch procedures
been used.18 5 For example, the pilot of an accident in Pyote,
Texas, did not contact the destination hospital in Lubbock until
after he departed with the patient on board. 6 Severe thunder-
storms in the area, along with brown-out conditions from blow-
ing dust and sand created fatal flight conditions.1 8 7 The
helicopter crashed into terrain, resulting in the death of the pi-
lot, a flight paramedic, the patient, and the patient's mother. 8
179 See NTSB Special Investigation Report, supra note 2, at 7-10.
180 NTSB, Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements, supra note 1.
181 Air Dispatcher Training Should Make EMS Flights Safer, AIR SAFETY WK., Apr.




184 Id. See NTSB, Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements, supra
note 1; NTSB Special Investigation Report, supra note 2, at 7-10; Federal Aviation
Administration, Safety Alert for Operators 06001,Jan. 28, 2006, available at http:/
/www.faa.gov/othervisit/aviation-industry/airline-operators/airlinesafety/
safo/all safos/media/2006/safoO600l.pdf (recommended Operator Initiative
a(3) suggests dispatchers be included as part of safety culture within helicopter
EMS operations).
185 NTSB Special Investigation Report, supra note 2, at 7-8.
186 Id. at 5-6; see also id. app. A at 20-21.
187 Id. app. A at 20-21.
188 Id.
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The NTSB cited "the pilot's inadvertent encounter with adverse
weather, . . dark night conditions, the pilot's inadequate pre-
flight preparation and planning, and the pressure to complete
the mission" as the causes of the accident.189 It is sobering to
learn that had the pilot obtained a weather report pre-flight, he
would have been informed of the thunderstorm activity. 9 ° And,
though a significant weather bulletin was not issued until fifteen
minutes after the flight had departed with the patient on board,
had a formalized dispatch and flight-following procedure been
in place, the pilot would have been updated and may have
aborted the flight. 9 '
In an effort to improve the role dispatchers play in the safety
of EMS flight operations, EagleMed air ambulance service of
Wichita, Kansas, introduced an EMS air dispatcher training cur-
riculum in 2006.192 The course is designed to educate dispatch-
ers in a broad array of topics that are typically involved in the
dispatch of both helicopters and fixed-wing EMS aircraft. 193 Al-
len Zon, director of operations at EagleMed, designed the cur-
riculum to include "use of the latest in navigational tracking and
satellite communications, visual displays, and terrain and obsta-
cle awareness systems.' 19 4
The National Association of Air-Medical Communication Spe-
cialists (NAACS), established in 1989, is an organization estab-
lished to promote and educate air medical communications
specialists.9 5 Industry experts assembled at a 2006 Safety Sum-
mit sponsored by the NAACS to address proposed FAA regula-
tions focusing on EMS flight dispatch procedures. 19 6 A
summary of discussions from the summit showed that experts
generally agreed that communications specialists (dispatchers)
could be trained to access and interpret weather reports.'97 Fur-
ther, there was a general consensus that accreditation and certi-
fication of communications specialists would enhance
operational safety. 198 Putting communications specialists in
189 Id.
190 Id. at 8.
19, Id.
192 Air Dispatcher Training Should Make EMS Rights Safer, supra note 181.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Robin Cockerill, Garet Hickman & Frank Thomas, The Changing Role of Air
Medical Communication Specialists, 28 AIR MED. J. 26, 26 (2009).
196 See id. at 28-29.
197 Id. at 29.
198 Id.
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touch with the health care provider as early in the decision-mak-
ing process as possible would likely prevent some of the per-
ceived misuse of HEMS flights.1 99
Participants also agreed that pursuing technology such as sat-
ellite tracking and visual weather displays would enhance the
safety of HEMS operations.20 0 However, the majority of experts
were opposed to measures that would "formalize" dispatch pro-
cedures.2 ° 1 Moreover, the FAA stated that such procedures
would not be pursued at the time.20 2 Panelists of the summit
generally agreed that better training, rather than formalized dis-
patch, was the answer to enhancing safety. 203 According to the
panel, a formalized dispatch system, perhaps similar to that of
the airlines, was neither cost effective nor in the interest of en-
hancing safety.20 4
The NTSB obviously disagrees with the panel of experts cited
above. 205 The Safety Board asserts that "[a]n effective dispatch
combined with a flight risk evaluation program.., enhances the
safety of these often-difficult missions. '2 6 A system that features
a dispatcher knowledgeable in "operations, weather, mainte-
nance, and flight-following" would be an asset to EMS flight op-
erations. 20 A person possessing this knowledge would be able
to advise the flight crew on the changing elements of a flight
and possibly instruct the pilot on whether to continue or abort a
mission. 20  The Safety Board stresses that part of the impor-
tance of such a position is having a member of the operation
who is detached from the urgency and emotion of the situa-
tion.20 9 The NTSB makes clear that the FAA should impose for-
malized dispatch procedures as a requirement, 210 and not
merely issue a non-binding advisory.
199 See TradingMarkets.com, supra note 25.
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D. TERRAIN AWARENESS AND WARNING SYSTEMS
Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (TAWS) are instru-
ments designed to aid pilots in predicting what lies ahead of
them as they fly.211 Two studies provide useful background on
TAWS and their applications: Development and Testing of an Ad-
vanced Terrain Awareness and Warning System (Study 1) and Rotary
Wing Terrain Awareness Warning Study (Study 2). Several types of
TAWS have evolved over the years and can allow for more accu-
rate warnings for operators as they approach potentially danger-
ous terrain.21 2 A Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS)
displays terrain data along with weather, air traffic, and other
flight data on an aircraft's multifunction display.213 Also de-
scribed as active or passive sensor technology,2 14 terrain data in a
GPWS is captured via a "lookdown" sensor and is used to deter-
mine altitude and slope of the terrain immediately beneath the
aircraft and to predict what lies ahead.215 The Enhanced
Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) evolved from the
GPWS and makes terrain predictions based on a terrain
database that has been previously loaded into the system.21 6
With the EGPWS the pilot receives earlier warnings, but the
warnings are only as accurate as the database. 217 The Ground
Collision Avoidance System (GCAS) uses a terrain database as
well, though it does not incorporate other information into a
multifunction display like the GPWS and EGPWS.218
Study 1 discusses the fact that most TAWS are designed for
larger commercial aircraft where federal regulations require
211 See Shen Qu, Development and Testing of an Advanced Terrain Awareness and
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their use. 219 The size and cost of such systems makes their use
"impractical for smaller, general aviation aircraft. '22' The devel-
opment of reliable, compact, and affordable TAWS is certainly
something that is needed, and not just in the field of EMS flight
operations, since 86% of all accidents occur with general avia-
tion aircraft, and 16% of fatalities involve controlled flight into
terrain (CFIT)221 CFIT occurs when an aircraft, under the con-
trol of the pilot, unintentionally flies into terrain, water, or
other structures, typically with no prior warning.222
The discussion of TAWS in Study 2 focuses on aspects that are
unique to helicopter flight.223 Though the instances described
by this study primarily deal with military applications, much of
the analysis proves to be similar to the field of HEMS opera-
tions. Military helicopters operate regularly at low altitude both
on and off shore.224 These operations typically involve taking off
from and landing on flight decks, search and rescue operations,
and tactical and non-tactical operations in environments over
land where trees, wires, and other obstacles pose a risk to the
success of the mission and safety of the crew.225 And at high
altitudes over land, mountainous terrain comes into play.22 6
In comparing the various types of TAWS, the authors of Study
2 describe the TAWS that utilize digital database systems as "rela-
tively mature technology, '227 although they, too, recognize that
the key issue with digital databases is "data accuracy. "'22 "Eleva-
tion accuracy and post location accuracy [e.g. location of electri-
cal towers] are essential elements to generating as many saves
and as few nuisance warnings as possible .... ,"229 After perform-
ing various test scenarios while in flight, the study concludes
that digital database TAWS technology "exhibited good potential
for predicting the presence of terrain and obstacles while oper-
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 See id. at 5-6.
222 Flight Safety Foundation, Controlled Flight into Terrain and Approach-
and-Landing Accident Reduction, http://www.flightsafety.org/cfitl.html (last vis-
ited Aug. 15, 2009).
223 See Barnhart & Engel, supra note 105, at 9.A.1.
224 Id. at 9.A.1-2.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 9.A.1-3.
228 Id. at 9.A.1-4.
229 Id.
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ating in the TERF [terrain flight] environment. ' 230 Though the
study points out that significant development is needed for "tac-
tical operations, ''2 31 it is important to remember that such devel-
opment is probably not needed for the majority of HEMS
operations.
The conclusions Study 2 reached on active and passive sensor
technology were somewhat less favorable.232 Active sensor was
deemed to have "good potential for detecting terrain and limited
potential for detecting obstacles. ' 233 Obviously, the detection of
obstacles is key to HEMS missions, which often call for landing
on urban streets or hospital rooftops in close proximity to man-
made obstacles. Further, active sensors pose space, weight, and
integration issues, as does the required mounting equipment on
the nose of the aircraft.2 34 As for passive sensor technology,
though the study revealed some long-term potential, current ap-
plications were deemed as falling short of the necessary ranging
capabilities for low-altitude terrain flight.23 5
V. ANALYZING THE NTSB'S MOST WANTED
A. SHOULD REGULATORS TAKE MORE PRECISE ACTION?
Simply put, yes, regulators should take more precise action
and implement tougher measures with respect to HEMS flight
operations. Unless action is taken to decrease the level of risk
associated with HEMS operations, accidents and fatalities will
continue at their current rates. Emergency medical aviation is
an extraordinary field in which pilots and crew members are
often asked to fly into dangerous situations and subject them-
selves to extraordinary risks. Those crew members, however,
should not be asked to make split-second decisions without op-
erational protocol that is both clearer and safer. Moving for-
ward, all HEMS operations should have the tools necessary to
operate safely. The decision of whether or not specific tools are
necessary should not be left solely to the same decision makers
who must evaluate the business aspects of an operation. Run-
ning a cost-effective HEMS operation and running a HEMS op-
eration that puts safety above all other aspects of the business
230 Id. at 9.A.1-9 (emphasis added).
231 Id. at 9.A.1-10.
232 See id. at 9.A.1-11-12.
233 Id. at 9.A.1-11 (emphasis added).
234 Id.
235 Id. at 9.A.1-4.
620
REGULATING SAFETY OF EMS FLIGHTS
are not necessarily business models that are synonymous with
one another. The regulatory bodies charged with oversight of
this industry, the NTSB and the FAA, along with Congress, have
the ability to immediately impact the industry with respect to
safety. Restrained, yet well-placed, meaningful regulation, will
reduce the risks associated with HEMS operations and save lives.
1. Require All HEMS Flights to Operate Under Part 135
Requiring all HEMS flights to operate under Part 135 appears
as the first item on the NTSB's Most Wanted List (as it relates to
HEMS operations) for good reasons. 236 A requirement that
HEMS operators conduct flights in accordance with Part 135
would likely be the quickest, most cost-effective way of improv-
ing HEMS safety and reducing accidents. While in flight, a
HEMS mission would be required to follow the more stringent
standards of Part 135 for weather, visibility, minimum altitude,
and the like. It is important to qualify that HEMS operators are
currently required to operate under Part 135 while patients are
on-board. A rule of this nature would simply extend the Part
135 requirement to the inbound or outbound legs of an EMS
mission, when a patient is either not yet on-board or has already
been received by a hospital. Thus, the only change for HEMS
operators from how they are currently allowed to operate would
be that they must operate under Part 135 on the legs of the
mission for which a patient is not on-board.
Though it has taken some time, to the FAA's credit, it will
require all HEMS operators to comply with Part 135 weather
minimums beginning in late February 2009. But if the goal is
safer operations, why has the FAA stopped at only including the
Part 135 weather minimums? HEMS operators will still be al-
lowed to operate under the more liberal requirements of Part
91 in an area that certainly has a huge effect on safety-crew
rest. For example, a crew can set out on a mission or series of
flights that end with a patient drop-off. If the crew has reached
its maximum duty time of fourteen hours, they would not be
allowed to continue to fly under Part 135. However, Part 91,
which has no limitation with respect to duty hours, would allow
the crew to continue to fly as long as patients are not on-board.
In essence, the regulations will require HEMS flights to operate
under the more stringent terms of Part 135 with respect to
weather minimums for all legs of a HEMS mission, but will allow
236 See NTSB, Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements, supra note 1.
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a fatigued crew to operate the aircraft as long as no patient is
on-board. It would certainly be well reasoned for the FAA to
extend all sections of Part 135 that HEMS operators currently
operate under for flights with patients on board, to flights when
only crew members are on-board.
2. Require Flight Risk Evaluation
From a logical perspective, it seems obvious that before as-
suming the inherent risks of a venture, one would first weigh
those risks against the probability of various outcomes. Apply-
ing this principle to EMS flight operations, certain questions
again seem obvious. Where are we going? How far must we
travel? Where will we land? Will the weather at the point of
take-off, at the destination, and en route permit our mission to
continue? This idea, however, is foreign to some operators in
the HEMS industry as evidenced by its inclusion on the NTSB's
Most Wanted List.2 37
The questions above seem almost trivial, yet flight risk evalua-
tion involves little more than answering a number of questions
associated with a given flight and applying those answers in a
way that measures the risks of the mission. As mentioned previ-
ously, an AMPA study cited in the NTSB's 2006 special investiga-
tion report states that "an effective flight risk evaluation
program acknowledges and identifies threats, evaluates and pri-
oritizes the risks, considers the probability that a risk will materi-
alize, and mitigates loss. ''238 Simple? Yes. And the answers to
the questions above would certainly aid in the assessment of
flight risk. When the answers are applied to the experience of
the crew and the type and condition of the aircraft, a clearer
picture of the inherent risks of a mission develops.
The NTSB points to a risk management program put in place
by HEMS operator Intermountain Health Care (IHC), after a
2003 Salt Lake City accident, as one model for success. 23 19 The
IHC model begins with pilots filling out a risk matrix as their
shift begins.24 ° When a call is received the pilot answers the re-
maining questions, completes the matrix, and calculates the
flight risk.24 1 The pilot must obtain increasing levels of approval
237 See id.
238 NTSB Special Investigation Report, supra note 2, at 4.
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prior to accepting the mission, depending on the level of risk
associated with the flight-low, medium, or high.242 The dis-
patcher, too, must agree to accept the mission.243 This system
keeps one person from being the sole decision maker when it
comes to accepting a mission.244
Much like requiring all segments of EMS flights to operate
under Part 135, requiring the implementation of flight risk eval-
uation procedures need not be an expensive undertaking.
While the ideas surrounding and methods for carrying out these
procedures would certainly vary in degrees of complexity, opera-
tors can begin some form of evaluation procedure immediately.
The questions need not be daunting and the formula or matrix
for evaluating the risk need not be overly involved. Nor is an
expensive array of complex weather equipment necessary. Op-
erators can utilize both government and private weather fore-
casting and analysis. The goal is to gather information
concerning various elements of each EMS mission and apply a
set of predetermined standards that will help crew members de-
cide whether or not a mission should be attempted. This
removes the emotion and urgency associated with a call for the
crews' services. Ideally, flight risk evaluation should be a part of
formalized dispatch procedures.
3. Require Formalized Dispatch Procedures
Experts have generally been opposed to formalized dispatch
procedures.245 And, when the dispatch system of the airlines is
generally used as a descriptive benchmark, who can argue with
them? 246 However, surely a solution exists that does not bring to
mind the inevitable hassle and delays associated with the anti-
quated method in which commercial flights are dispatched.
First, most would probably agree that the system of dispatch
used by the airlines was not originally designed to handle the
number of commercial flights that are typical today. And sec-
ond, EMS flights would likely never approach a level of regular-
ity comparable to commercial airline flights. EMS flights,
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4. Set a Realistic Date for Mandatory Use of TAWS
Without a doubt, requiring the installation and use of TAWS
in EMS helicopters is the most expensive of the recommenda-
tions on the NTSB's Most Wanted List. It would be unrealistic
to expect all HEMS operators to comply with such a require-
ment overnight. However, just because such compliance is not
immediately possible does not mean that the industry should
not work towards the goal of having a TAWS in every EMS air-
craft. The NTSB has recommended the use of TAWS for HEMS
operations, 247 and the FAA has worked with industry groups to
determine a set of standards for the application of TAWS in heli-
copters.2 4 Now is the time for the FAA to begin requiring the
use of TAWS, and it can do so on a timeline that considers the
economic strain on HEMS operators.
A well-planned, methodical implementation of this technol-
ogy will ensure that future EMS flights have the tools necessary
to operate safely. First, the FAA should require that all new air-
craft purchased for use by EMS operators include a TAWS.
Next, the FAA should require that all pre-owned aircraft pur-
chased by EMS operators be outfitted with a TAWS. These first
two steps ensure that only those willing to make the capital out-
lay required for new or pre-owned aircraft will be burdened by
the costs of these systems, which should cause fewer shock waves
in the industry. Slowly, as operators replace their aircraft, TAWS
systems will become more and more common. The last step
should be to set a future date for which a TAWS will be required
in order to operate an aircraft for EMS purposes. Industry par-
ticipants would be consulted in regards to a realistic date of total
compliance. By using a concise, methodical approach, each
year the FAA would require that older aircraft be equipped with
TAWS or removed from service. A strategy like this would avoid
shocking the industry all at once with exorbitant costs, yet ulti-
mately all EMS aircraft would be in compliance and the industry
would operate in a safer manner because of this technology.
B. CONCLUSION
EMS flight operators provide a valuable service to patients in
need of urgent care and will continue to do so for the foresee-
able future. When other modes of transportation are not neces-
sarily a practical option, EMS flight operators can transport
247 See NTSB, Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements, supra note 1.
248 FAA, Fact Sheet, supra note 3.
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critically-ill and injured patients between medical centers, from
rural, outlying, and isolated areas, and from congested urban
cities. The men and women who have chosen this profession
cannot be expected to consistently isolate themselves from the
urgency and emotion that is inherent to this field. They should
not be forced or allowed to stay on duty for unreasonably ex-
tended periods. Pilots should not be given such broad discre-
tion concerning VFRs or weather minimums, that they are
unable to make sound decisions regarding the safety of their
passengers and crew. Finally, they should not be the sole deci-
sion maker regarding flight parameters, especially when weather
and flight information can be communicated easily and quickly
by other members of an EMS flight operation. The profession-
als who risk their lives on a daily basis to respond to the needs of
others deserve a level of regulatory oversight that will ensure
they operate in the safest manner possible.
The NTSB has made the appropriate recommendations more
than once, and it is time for those recommendations to be im-
plemented. 24" The FAA must carry out its statutory duty to im-
prove safety and prevent accidents by implementing the NTSB's
recommendations.2 0 When it comes to regulating the safety of
EMS flights, the FAA must move beyond issuing advisories and
guidance. They must do what is necessary to make the NTSB's
recommendations mandatory.
By making the recommendations on the NTSB's Most Wanted
List mandatory, the FAA will make EMS flights safer and thus
save lives. To summarize, the FAA should first require all seg-
ments of an EMS mission to operate under Part 135 for weather
and visibility requirements, and the corresponding crew rest and
duty time requirements. Second, the FAA must require EMS op-
erators to implement flight risk evaluation programs. As men-
tioned previously, these first two items can be implemented
fairly quickly, and the operational impact and cost would be
negligible. Next, the FAA should move to require formalized
dispatch procedures. Requiring formalized dispatch will help to
avoid using EMS flights unnecessarily. Moreover, by having a
member of an EMS flight crew who is removed from the ur-
gency and emotion of the situation, providing up-to-the-minute
weather reports and flight data, EMS flights will be notably safer.
Finally, the FAA should take steps to begin requiring the use of
249 See NTSB, Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements, supra note 1.
250 See 49 U.S.C. § 44701 (c) (2000 & Supp. V).
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TAWS in EMS aircraft. Though this final recommendation is
probably best integrated gradually, beginning the integration
immediately is certainly not premature.
The FAA has the authority to implement the changes recom-
mended by the NTSB and can do so as soon as it feels the safety
of EMS flight operations warrant the measures recom-
mended.251 Though congressional action is on the horizon, it is
not necessary.252 The FAA has already been granted the statu-
tory authority to require that HEMS operators meet these mea-
sures.253 Further, possible congressional action should sound an
alarm within the ranks of the FAA and alert the Agency that it is
moving far too slowly. Legislators ultimately want the phone
calls from concerned citizens to cease with their safety concerns
met. The FAA can meet these concerns by carrying out the rec-
ommendations of the NTSB. 254 The goal here is not to provide
regulatory "red-tape" or burden an industry with administrative
oversight. The goal, quite simply, is to improve EMS flight oper-
ations so that regulators, operators, and consumers are equally
confident in the safety of these flights.
251 See NTSB, Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements, supra note 1.
252 See, e.g., S. 3229, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008); H.R. 3939, 110th Cong. (1st.
Sess. 2007).
253 Department of Transportation Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-449, 96 Stat.
2416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
254 NTSB, Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements, supra note 1.
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